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INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Alastair M.
Taylor. Published under the auspices of The Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1960. Pp. xx.ix,
503. $7.50.
The author disclaims a "definitive" character for this account of "Indonesian Independence and the United Nations," calling it a case study of
the activities and effectiveness of the United Nations in the field of pacific
settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter. However, his meticulously
thorough, detailed and comprehensive treatment is likely to remain the
standard treatment of the subject for a long time to come. He writes from
the vantage point of having served, as a member of the United Nations
Secretariat, with the Security Council's field machinery in Indonesia until
shortly before the adjournment, sine die, of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in April 1951. He writes, therefore, with authority from
first-hand knowledge, making effective use of interviews with participants
as well as the voluminous United Nations documentation. The more interesting and useful part of the book, especially from the point of view of
the lawyer or political scientist, is to be found in the analysis in Parts Four
and Five of the roles of the protaganists, the United Nations, and the
permanent members of the Council, plus Australia, Belgium and India.
It requires concentration to maintain one's bearings in the multiplicity of
details which make up the historical account in Parts One to Three.
In his Foreword, Lester B. Pearson, former Foreign Minister of Canada,
speaking of World War II as a forcing ground of change in the existing
political order, remarks that in no place were the hopes for the future and
the frustrations and bloodshed in the means of realizing them more tragically associated than in Indonesia. This was the more tragic, he points out,
because the freedom of the Indonesian people was an objective admitted
by all, including the Dutch, as something both necessary and desirable.
But it took four years of struggle for the Parties, and of testing for the new
United Nations, before this came to pass. Pearson observes that its intervention there established a pattern of policy, if not of machinery for the
future, and adds: "In particular, decisions taken by the Security Council
began the process of whittling away the Charter reservation of 'domestic
jurisdiction' until now it is not much more. than something to be observed
at the United Nations only if you have the votes, or the influence, to make
good your claim that it must be."
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The Republic of Indonesia was born, Taylor tells us, on August 17,
1945 - two days after Japan's capitulation to the Allied Powers. It was
inaugurated in Djakarta with the reading at the residence of the nationalist
leader, Sukarno, of what is undoubtedly the shortest proclamation of independence on record: "We the Indonesian people proclaim the independence
of Indonesia. All matters pertaining to the transfer of power, etc., will be
carried out efficiently and in the shortest possible time. On behalf of the
Indonesian people - Sukarno, Hatta." It is not surprising that there should
be conflict and trial in the transfer to a nation so informally launched of
the sovereignty over the rich Indonesian archipelago that had been vested
in the proud Dutch State for over three hundred years.
The Indonesian case is notable in a number of ways for the United
Nations - it was one of the first political cases to be brought to the Security
Council; it was the first case in which the United Nations played an instrumental part in the erection of an independent state out of a former
colony; it was the first case in which the United Nations carried a major
political problem through to a definitive and successful conclusion.
It appeared first on the Security Council Agenda in January 1946 at
the Council's First Session, on a charge by the Ukrainian S.S.R. that
British troops and Japanese enemy armed forces were participating in
military operations against the local Indonesian population. "I give you
the lie that we have attacked the Indonesians," was Foreign Minister
Bevin's reply to the charges. A proposal by the Ukraine calling for a Commission to investigate was rejected, with supporting votes only from the
Soviets and Poland. The Netherlands representative, invoking Article 2 (7)
on domestic jurisdiction, declared there was no threat to international
peace as "a sincere and whole-hearted attempt" was being made to put
Indonesia "in order on a very liberal basis."
The Linggadjati Agreement initialled on November 15, 1946 and signed
by the Dutch Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on March 25, 1947, provided that the parties should "cooperate in the
rapid formation of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis to be
called the United States of Indonesia." Increasingly violent disagreements
over this agreement culminated in the inauguration by the Dutch on July
20, 1947 of "police action" against the Republic's forces, and on July 31
Australia and India brought the case to the Security Council. Australia,
invoking Article 39 of the Charter, alleged the hostilities constituted a
breach of the peace, and called upon the Parties, pursuant to Article 40, to
cease hostilities forthwith. The Netherlands Representative maintained the
question was one essentially within the jurisdiction of his government, that
under Article 2 (7) the Council was without jurisdiction, and that Chapter
VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression) was not applicable since there was no danger to international peace and security, "let alone breaches of the peace or acts of aggression in the sense of the Charter.'' The "application of enforcement
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measures under Chapter VII" is a specific exception to the domestic jurisdiction limitation.
In order to enable the Council to take timely action to halt the conflict
the United States proposed to delete references to any article of the Charter.
This was done and in the fourteen Resolutions adopted by the Council in
the ensuing three years no Charter provision was invoked as a basis for its
action.
While the Council could no doubt have found basis for some of its
actions in Chapter VII, and did without invoking them, it preferred to
finesse the question of the basis for its jurisdiction. It acted as a political
organ, and essentially on political grounds. Confronted with a situation
which would not wait, the Council chose in effect to treat it as a matter
likely to endanger international peace and security. Taylor says that, "At
all times the majority of the members favored a solution of the dispute on
a political, rather than a juridical basis." He adds at a later point, "A
strictly juridical approach by the United Nations, namely, to have accepted
the Netherlands argument and to have washed its hands of the problem,
could not have solved the issue because of the international friction which
had already been generated and which threatened to become worse." As
indicated by Pearson's statement quoted above, the Security Council has not
shown too tender a regard for the Domestic Jurisdiction limitations imposed
by Article 2 (7). It has demonstrated a continuing penchant for action to
implement what it considers the overriding purpose of the Charter -the
maintenance of peace. It has exhibited a strong disinclination to be confined by restrictive juridical interpretations.
The problem and position of the Council was further complicated by
the fact that it was dealing not with two contestants equal in law, but with
the emergence of a colonial entity into the condition of statehood. While
the Republic of Indonesia at first contended that the sovereignty of the
Netherlands had been terminated with the Japanese conquest, it later receded in practice from this position. In its Resolution of January 28, 1949,
the Council spoke explicitly of "the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia
by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia."
Nevertheless, in the Council's proceedings and in the measures carried out
by it the Republic was dealt with as at least a de facto sovereign, its action
implying, according to Kelsen, "an indirect recognition of the Indonesian
Republic as a 'State.' "
The measures employed by the Council during the more than three
years it was seized of the case were of a character to fall both under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter - cease fire orders, establishment of military
supervision machinery, calls for troop withdrawals under Chapter VII, and
good offices under Chapter VI. In the early stages it relied on a Good
Offices Committee, converted into a United Nations Commission by the
Resolution of January 28, 1949. Taylor portrays two United States representatives as playing key, influential roles, Dr. Frank Graham in the earlier
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stages, and Ambassador Merle Cochran later, particularly in the successful
conclusion of the Round Table Conference at the Hague from August 23
to November 2, 1949. The overall United States role comes out of Taylor's
pages with a rather Machiavellian cast, but as a decisive factor in the final
successful outcome.
On September 28, 1950, Indonesia became the sixtieth Member of the
United Nations. The Indonesian Representative in the Security Council
declared: "We realize that without the intervention of the Security Council
the Indonesian Question would have been solved on the battlefield by
force." Taylor's final appraisal is that the settlement was achieved ex acquo
et bono and that the United Nations was able thus to perform what the
Powers that brought it into existence could not have achieved either singly
or in disparate groups.
Durward V. Sandifer,
Professor of International Relations,
American University, Washington, D.C.

